California\u27s New Newsmen\u27s Sheild Law and the Criminal Defendant\u27s Right to a Fair Trial by Sipos, Richard A.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 26 | Number 1 Article 6
1-1-1986
California's New Newsmen's Sheild Law and the
Criminal Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial
Richard A. Sipos
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Richard A. Sipos, Comment, California's New Newsmen's Sheild Law and the Criminal Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial, 26 Santa Clara
L. Rev. 219 (1986).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol26/iss1/6
CALIFORNIA'S "NEW" NEWSMEN'S SHIELD LAW AND
THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1980, California voters passed Proposition 5 and thereby ele-
vated Evidence Code section 1070, the so-called "newsmen's shield
law," to constitutional status. This new constitutional amendment,
article I, section 2(b),1 provides journalists with an absolute immu-
nity2 from being adjudged in contempt for a refusal to disclose either
unpublished information or the identity of a confidential source.'
Two factors prompted the legislature to propose the constitu-
tional resolution. First, the 1972 United States Supreme Court deci-
© 1986 by Richard A. Sipos
1. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b) (West 1983) provides:
(b) A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or em-
ployed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, or by a
press association or wire service, or any person who has been so connected or
employed, shall not be adjudged in contempt by a judicial, legislative, or admin-
istrative body, or any other body having the power to issue subpoenas, for refus-
ing to disclose the source of any information procured while so connected or
employed for publication in a newspaper, magazine or other periodical publica-
tion, or for refusing to disclose any unpublished information obtained or pre-
pared in gathering, receiving or processing of information for communication to
the public.
Nor shall a radio or television news reporter or other person connected
with or employed by a radio or television station, or any person who has been so
connected or employed, be so adjudged in contempt for refusing to disclose the
source of any information procured while so connected or employed for news or
news commentary purposes on radio or television, or for refusing to disclose any
unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or
processing of information for communication to the public.
As used in this subdivision, "unpublished information" includes informa-
tion not disseminated to the public by the person from whom disclosure is
sought, whether or not related information has been disseminated and includes,
but is not limited to, all notes, outtakes, photographs, tapes or other data of
whatever sort not itself disseminated to the public through a medium of commu-
nication, whether or not published information based upon or related to such
material has been disseminated.
Id.
2. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1070 and CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 2(b) provide only an immunity
against being adjudged in contempt; neither affords the newsman a privilege to withhold
information.
3. CAL. CONsT. art. 1, § 2(b).
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sion, Branzburg v. Hayes,' which rejected a first amendment jour-
nalist privilege in a criminal proceeding, invited state legislatures to
fashion their own standards for a newsmen's privilege.0 Second, dur-
ing the 1970s, California appellate courts created four distinct excep-
tions to Evidence Code section 1070. These exceptions' were per-
ceived as a threat to the free flow of information from the news
media to the public.7 As a result, the California electorate amended
article I, section 2(b) to the state constitution, and seemingly afforded
newsmen the highest level of state law protection.
Unfortunately, the legislature submitted a proposal which was
nearly identical to Evidence Code section 1070.' The legislature did
not explain how the new amendment would affect the rights of jour-
nalists, the four judicially-created exceptions, or the criminal defend-
ant's right to a fair trial.
Thus far, criminal proceedings have fostered an acute conflict
between the journalist and the criminal defendant. The journalist
will often refuse to testify and to produce evidence, relying on the
newsmen's immunity against contempt orders. The criminal defend-
ant will then assert his sixth amendment right to obtain witnesses
and to a fair trial to justify the forced disclosure of the newsman's
information. Between these adversaries lies the court, which has the
duty to administer justice by balancing these two competing interests.
By failing to clarify its intent, the California Legislature has in fact
done very little to quell the conflict between the media and the de-
fendant in a criminal proceeding.
This comment will provide a practical set of standards to evalu-
ate the competing interests asserted in a criminal proceeding. A
background to the amended article I, section 2(b) will be presented,
including the legislative history of Evidence Code section 1070. Next,
the comment will examine the development of a first amendment and
federal common law privilege which culminated in the landmark
case of Branzburg v. Hayes. The four judicially-created exceptions
4. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
5. Id. at 706.
6. Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1011 (1972); Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 421 (1978); Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608
(1979). See infra notes 75-123 and accompanying text.
7. See California Ballot Pamphlet, Primary Election 19 (June 3, 1980) [hereinafter cited
as Pamphlet].
8. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2(b). For the changes, compare with CAL. EVID. CODE §
1070 (West Supp. 1984).
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will then be discussed. In discussing both federal and state law, this
comment will focus on the types of interests and concerns that have
militated against recognition of an absolute newsman's immunity.
Following this legislative and judicial background, the new arti-
cle I, section 2(b) will be scrutinized for legislative intent to deter-
mine what effect the new amendment should have. The four excep-
tions contained in Farr v. Superior Court, Rosato v. Superior
Court, CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, and Hammarley v. Superior
Court' will then be discussed with respect to whether they should
apply to the newly enacted amendment. The rules of statutory con-
struction, the Official Ballot Pamphlet for Proposition 5 and policy
arguments will be utilized to determine the applicability of the ex-
ceptions to article 1, section 2(b). To illustrate the typical scenario in
which a newsman is adjudged in contempt, a recent hearing involv-
ing former San Jose Mercury News reporter Jeff Kaye 0 will be dis-
cussed in detail. A general discussion of the press and the criminal
defendant's interests will follow. Case law decided after the amend-
ment of Evidence Code section 1070 to the constitution will be
presented to assist in the analysis of article I, section 2(b). Finally, a
practical test that is consistent with the legislature's intent"1 and
which balances the various competing interests will be set forth.
II. BACKGROUND: HISTORY TO 1980
A. Evidence Code Section 1070
In 1935, the California Legislature enacted the state's first
shield law by amending former Code of Civil Procedure section
1881.12 This first shield law provided an immunity from contempt
for newspaper employees who refused to disclose their sources to
courts or legislative bodies. The only legislative history regarding
this law is a brief introductory policy declaration stating, "[tihere are
particular relations in which it is the policy of the law to encourage
confidence and to preserve it inviolate .... ,,a However, five
9. See supra note 6.
10. See infra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
11. The term "legislative intent" as used in this comment represents the will of both the
legislature and the electorate.
12. 1935 Cal. Stat. 532, § 1, amending 1927 Cal. Stat. 683, § I (codified in CAL. CODE
CIv. PROC. § 1881 (6) (West 1955) (repealed and reenacted in CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West
1966)). CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1881 was enacted in 1872. It granted privileges to attorneys,
clergymen, physicians, spotises and public officials from giving testimony. The first newsmen's
privilege became CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1881(6).
13. 1935 Cal. Stat. 532, § 1, at 1609 (1935) (codified in CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1881
19861
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highly-publicized cases, which involved newsmen who had based
their silence on professional ethics and were consequently jailed for
contempt, were most likely responsible for this enactment. 4
The scope of the immunity was broadened in 1961 to include
the electronic media. 5 When evidence laws were codified in 1965,
this enlarged version became Evidence Code section 1070. The Cali-
fornia Law Revision Commission, which was responsible for the ini-
tial drafting of the Evidence Code, suggested that the privilege be
discretionary rather than absolute." However, the Assembly Judici-
ary Committee rejected this proposed revision and transferred the
former law intact into the Evidence Code.17 The Committee's deci-
sion was most likely the result of statewide journalists' editorials and
lobbying in Sacramento. 8 The only legislative history for section
1070 was a brief Comment by the Assembly Judiciary Committee
stating that ection 1070 provides an immunity from being adjudged
in contempt, but does not create a privilege."
Since 1965, section 1070 has been amended by statutes in 1971,
1972, and 1974.20 These amendments have broadened the scope of
protection afforded newsmen.2 ' The current section 107022 was in-
corporated almost verbatim into the California Constitution as article
I, section 2(b)."' It provides protection to publishers, editors, report-
ers or other persons connected with, employed by, or formerly em-
ployed by newspapers, magazines or other periodicals, and press or
wire associations." The newsman holds the immunity; the actual
(West 1955)) (repealed by CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1966)).
14. Note, The Right of a Newsman to Refrain from Divulging the Sources of His Infor-
mation, 36 VA. L. REV. 61, 71-73 (1950).
15. 1961 Cal. Stat. 629, § I, at 1798 (1961), amending 1935 Cal. Stat. 532, § 1, at 1610
(1935).
16. A California Privilege Not Covered by the Uniform Rules - Newsmen's Privilege 6
CAL. LAW REVISION COMM., REP., REC. & STUDIES, 481, 502 (1964).
17. Other Measures, 7 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM., REP., REC. & STUDIES 913 (1965).
18. See Comment, Newsmen's Immunity Needs a Shot in the Arm, I1 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 56, 61 (1970-71).
19. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1966) (Comment, Assembly Committee on Judici-
ary). "Privilege" as used in this context means a privilege not to testify.
20. See 1971 Cal. Stat 1717, § 1; 1972 Cal. Stat 1431, § 1; 1974 Cal. Stat. 1323, § 1; 1974
Cal. Stat. 1456, § 2.
21. For the effect of these amendments, see CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1984).
These amendments extended the protection to magazines, other publications, and to a wider
range of news-disseminating processes.
22. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1984).
23. See supra note 1.
24. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1984).
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source of the information may not invoke it.25 Section 1070's protec-
tion, then, merely immunizes the newsman from being held in con-
tempt by a judicial, legislative, or administrative body.2 The statute,
as the Assembly Judiciary Committee pointed out, does not provide
a privilege to remain silent,2 7 as do the attorney-client, physician-
patient or husband-wife privileges.2" Rather, the protection against
being adjudged in contempt is provided only when the newsman ref-
uses to disclose a confidential source or any unpublished
information.29
This protection was expanded in Rosato v. Superior Court" to
include the disclosure of any information, in whatever form, which
might tend to reveal the newsman's source."' The Rosato interpreta-
tion was expanded even further in Hammarley v. Superior Court,2
which held that "unpublished information" encompasses all undis-
seminated information obtained by a newsman in the course of his
professional activities."3 The practical effect of these decisions was to
bring virtually all information collected by newsmen under the stat-
ute as long as the information was not disseminated to the public.
Typically, when a newsman was subpoenaed to appear and
produce evidence which he deemed confidential, the newsman would
base his claim of privilege on two grounds: Evidence Code section
1070 and the first amendment of the United States Constitution."
Before addressing the protection of section 1070, it is essential to
consider the protection afforded to newsmen under the Constitution,
as similar criteria are frequently employed to analyze the newsman's
privilege under both claims.
25. See supra note 1.
26. Id.
27. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1966) (Comment, Assembly Committee on Judici-
ary). This is a significant distinction, particularly when the newsman is a party to a civil
proceeding. For example, a court may not hold the newsman in contempt for refusal to make
discovery, but it may invoke various sanctions against the newsman (as authorized by CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE § 2034(b)(2) (A)-(F) (West 1983)) such as striking claims or defenses,
prohibiting the introduction of evidence, dismissing the action or entering a default judgment.
Thus, in defamation actions, § 1070 offers little, if any, protection to the "silent" newsman.
See, e.g., KSDO v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1982).
28. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 954, 994, 971 & 980 (West 1966 & Supp. 1984).
29. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1984).
30. 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 917 (1976).
31. Id. at 217-18, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
32. 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979).
33. Id. at 397-98, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
34. The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part,
"congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
19861
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B. Federal Case Law
Garland v. Torre85 was the first civil case in which a newsman
claimed a constitutional privilege. Newspaper columnist Marie
Torre published certain statements attributed to unnamed CBS exec-
utives about actress Judy Garland. Garland sued CBS for breach of
contract and libel and sought the executives' identities from both
CBS and Torre. Torre refused to disclose her sources on first
amendment grounds, asserting that such a forced disclosure of confi-
dential sources would unduly impinge upon the flow of news to the
public." The federal court held Torre in contempt."
In considering Torre's claim, the Second Circuit acknowledged
that compelling Torre to disclose her source would abridge the free-
dom of the press, but it concluded that the freedom was not an abso-
lute right." The court balanced Torre's first amendment rights
against "a paramount public interest in the fair administration of
justice." 8 The court ultimately rejected Torre's first amendment ar-
gument;'0 however, it did require that in order to compel disclosure,
the requested confidential information must go to the "heart of the
plaintiff's claim.' 1' This requirement is significant because the
"heart of the claim" standard is more exacting than a requirement of
mere relevancy. Under this standard, the party seeking the news-
man's material must show that the material is essential to his case.
The relevancy standard requires a showing of generalized need. Al-
though Garland provided newsmen with some semblance of protec-
tion via the "heart of the claim" requirement, the crux of the case
reiterated that the first amendment's freedom of the press protection
was not absolute.
The seminal case in the criminal context, in which the news-
men's interest in protecting confidential sources and information
clashed with the defendant's assertion of his sixth amendment right
to a fair trial was Branzburg v. Hayes.4' The Branzburg case was a
consolidation of four cases' 8 involving three reporters who had been
35. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
36. Id. at 547-48.
37. Id. at 548.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 549.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 550. In Garland, the identity of Torre's source was crucial to Judy Garland's
libel action.
42. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
43. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Branzburg v. Meigs, 503
S.W.2d 748 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971); Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970),
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called to testify before respective grand juries about information re-
ceived in the course of their professional activities."" Two of the re-
porters asserted a privilege to conceal confidential sources and infor-
mation,"' while the third claimed a privilege not to appear before the
grand jury.4" On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, all
three claimed a qualified privilege to conceal confidential sources and
information. 7
The Branzburg case contained four opinions. In the plurality
opinion, Justice White characterized the heart of the newsmen's
claim as "the burden on news gathering" resulting from compelled
disclosure of confidential information. 4" This consequential burden
was not sufficient, however, to merit interference with the constitu-
tionally-mandated grand jury proceeding." Justice White was also
unwilling to afford newsmen any preferential treatment not available
to other members of the public under the first amendment."0 Thus,
he rejected a qualified newsmen's privilege and held that newsmen
must appear before grand juries and answer all "relevant questions"
during a criminal investigation.' This decision rejected Garland's
more stringent "heart of the claim" standard, opting instead for the
criminal relevancy standard. Although the Supreme Court was re-
luctant to create a qualified privilege, Justice White discusses the
possibility that Congress could enact a statutory newsmen's privilege,
and he invited the states to fashion their own standards within first
amendment limits."2 In addition, the plurality opinion indicated the
rev'd sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266
N.E.2d 297 (1971).
44. See generally Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege
for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709, 710-13 (1975) (a detailed discussion of the background
of the Branzburg case).
45. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345, 346 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Pappas, 358 Mass.
604, 605 n.1, 266 N.E.2d 297, 298 n.l.
46. Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1083.
47. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 680.
48. Id. at 681-82.
49. Id. at 682-90. The fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "no per-
son shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
50. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682-85.
51. Id. at 682-90.
52. At the federal level, Congress has freedom to determine whether a statutory news-
men's privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards and rules as narrow or
broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil discerned and, equally important, to refashion
those rules as experience from time to time may dictate. There is also merit in leaving state
legislatures free, within First Amendment limits, to fashion their own standards in light of the
conditions and problems with respect to the relations between law enforcement officials and
press in their own areas. It goes without saying, of course, that we are powerless to bar state
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Court would not interfere with state court recognition of a qualified
or absolute newsmen's privilege.5 3
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell did acknowledge a lim-
ited privilege for situations in which either the grand jury investiga-
tion was not being conducted in good faith, or the requested informa-
tion was only remotely relevant to the investigation.54 Justice Powell
advocated judicial discretion when necessary to strike a balance be-
tween the needs of the press and of the criminal justice system."'
Three of the dissenting Justices, Stewart, Brennan and Mar-
shall, supported a first amendment protection for newsmen." Justice
Stewart's opinion pointed to the "broad societal interest in a full and
free flow of information to the public" as the principal justification
for preserving the confidential relationship between the reporter and
his sources.5 7 He concluded that failure to recognize this protection
would undermine the value of a newsman's grant of confidentiality,
and thereby dry up his sources and impede the news gathering pro-
cess. 8 To determine when a newsman must divulge his confidential
information, Justice Stewart proposed a tripartite test:
The government must (1) show that there is probable cause to
believe that the newsman has information that is clearly rele-
vant to a specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that
the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means
less destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate
a compelling and overriding interest in the information."9
Justice Stewart believed that this test would provide adequate safe-
guards for the newsmen, while ensuring the administration of
justice. 60
Due to the numerous opinions in Branzburg, courts have had
courts from responding in their own way and construing their own constitutions so as to recog-
nize a newsmen's privilege, either qualified or absolute.
Id. at 706.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 710. In an asterisked footnote, Justice Powell rejected Justice Stewart's tri-
partite balancing test (see infra note 59 and accompanying text) because "the detection and
prosecution of crime would be heavily subordinated." 408 U.S. at 710.
56. Id. at 725-36 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas, who filed a separate dis-
senting opinion, advocated an absolute privilege except when the reporter himself was impli-
cated in a crime. Id. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 725-26 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 727-28.
59. Id. at 743. For an explanation of how Justice Stewart arrived at this test, see
Goodale, supra note 44, at 714-15.
60. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 745 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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extreme difficulty ascertaining a true holding." Courts have applied
three different interpretations of Branzburg.e2 Some courts have
held that Branzburg rejected any type of first amendment news-
men's privilege' 8 unless harassment of the press is involved." Other
courts, and probably the majority, have interpreted Branzburg as
granting newsmen at least a qualified first amendment privilege.6
For example, the Ninth Circuit in Farr v. Pitchess"' viewed
Branzburg as creating a "partial First Amendment shield." ' In ad-
dition, the Farr court extended Branzburg's application beyond
grand jury proceedings to include "other civil or criminal proceed-
ings as well."" Finally, some courts have recognized a qualified
privilege by focusing on Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which autho-
rizes federal courts to develop privileges in criminal cases "in the
light of reason and experience."69 In Lewis v. United States,10 the
61. Marcus, The Reporter's Privilege: An Analysis of the Common Law, Branzburg v.
Hayes, and Recent Statutory Developments, 25 ARiz. L. REV. 815, 836-39 (1983).
62. Id. at 841.
63. See, e.g., In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997
(1978); Resorts Int'l Inc. v. NJM Assoc., 180 N.J. Super. 459, 435 A.2d 572 (1981); Gagnon v.
District Court, 632 P.2d 567 (Colo. 1981); People v. Monroe, 82 Misc. 2d 850, 370 N.Y.S.2d
1007 (1975); Petition of McGowan, 298 A.2d 339 (Del. 1972), rev'd, 303 A.2d 645 (1973).
64. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707-08.
65. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 279, 690 P.2d 635, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 152 (1984); KSDO v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 385,186 Cal. Rptr. 211, 217
(1982); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. N.F.L., 89 F.R.D. 489, 492 (C.D. Cal.
1981); Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505, 509 (E.D. Va. 1976); Farr v. Pitch-
ess, 522 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); State v. Sandstrom,
224 Kan. 573, 574-75, 581 P.2d 812, 814-15 (1978); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139,
147 (3d Cir. 1980); Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1082 (9th Cir. 1972).
66. 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). For the details of
Farr, see infra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
67. 522 F.2d at 467.
68. Id.
69. FED. R. EvsD. 501 provides that,
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pur-
suant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principals of the
common law as they might be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies
the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
Id. (emphasis added).
70. 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975). In Lewis, a radio station manager was held in civil
contempt for failing to comply with a federal grand jury subpoena for production of a "com-
munique," received from a group claiming responsibility for a bomb explosion. The court of
appeals denied the manager a qualified first amendment privilege.
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Ninth Circuit interpreted the congressional intent behind Rule 501
as encouraging the federal courts "to develop the federal common
law of privilege on a case-by-case basis.""5 In a criminal case, then,
Rule 501 allows the federal courts to consider state privilege law,
but the rule ultimately adopted will be federal common law."
After Farr and Lewis, the Ninth Circuit recognized either a
federal common law qualified privilege or a first amendment quali-
fied privilege for newsmen. As a result, California newsmen have
and should continue to assert both a state statutory privilege"3 and a
constitutional or federal common law privilege when confronted with
a demand for their confidential sources or information. These quali-
fied privileges will then be balanced against competing interests, such
as a defendant's right to a fair trial, to determine whether an intru-
sion is justified. 74
C. California Case Law
During the 1970s, California appellate courts had four oppor-
tunities to address section 1070 immunity claims, and each time they
created an exception. Because section 1070 was incorporated into the
California Constitution almost verbatim, it is essential to consider
how these judicially-created exceptions contribute to the emascula-
tion of section 1070.
1. Farr v. Superior Court5
In 1970, William T. Farr, a reporter for the Los Angeles Her-
ald Examiner, was assigned to cover the trial of Charles Manson
and his codefendants for two sets of multiple murders. Early in the
proceedings, the superior court entered an Order re Publicity, which
prohibited any attorney, court employee, attache, or witness from re-
leasing any testimony or evidence to the public.78 During the course
71. Id. at 238 n.4.
72. Id. at 237.
73. Before 1980, newsmen would claim a privilege under Evidence Code § 1070. See
cases cited, infra notes 75-123 and accompanying text. After 1980, newsmen usually will claim
a § 1070 privilege and, more importantly, a California constitutional privilege under Article I,
section 2(b). See, cases cited infra notes 186-99 and accompanying text.
74. Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d at 468.
75. 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr: 342 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
Farr lost his case on appeal in Farr v. Superior Court. He then brought habeas corpus pro-
ceedings in the California State Court. In re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, Il Cal. Rptr. 649
(1974). Again Farr was unsuccessful so he petitioned for habeas corpus in federal court. Farr
v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975).
76. Farr v. Superior Ct., 22 Cal. App. 3d at 63-64, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
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of the trial, Farr published the statement of a potential witness
which he had received from three sources who were subject to the
protective order.7 After judgment in the Manson case, the trial court
called Farr as a witness to determine whether its protective order
had been violated, which in turn might possibly have jeopardized the
right of Manson and his codefendants to a fair trial. Farr refused to
divulge the identity of his sources pursuant to Evidence Code section
1070. The court held Farr in direct contempt78 and ordered him in-
carcerated until he answered the questions.79
Employing a separation of powers analysis, the appellate court
held that under the present facts, the application of section 1070 to
shield Farr from contempt would constitute an unconstitutional leg-
islative interference with the court's power to control its officers and
proceedings.8 0 Citing In re San Francisco Chronicle,8 the court rec-
ognized that the legislature could impose "reasonable restrictions"
upon the exercise of a court's contempt power, but emphasized that
the legislature could not declare that certain acts will not constitute
contempt.82 Thus, although the legislature had intended section 1070
to contain an absolute immunity,8" the immunity was now only dis-
cretionary. A court could deem section 1070 inapplicable and hold
newsmen in contempt when the newsman's refusal to identify a
source interfered with the court's ability to control its officers and
proceedings. In addition to considering the separation of powers is-
sue, the Farr court cited Sheppard v. Maxwell" as a United States
77. Id. The statement was from Mrs. Virginia Graham. It recited that Susan Atkins, a
codefendant in the murder prosecution, had confessed the crimes to Mrs. Graham in "lurid"
detail. The statement also implicated Manson and described future plans to murder in a hide-
ous fashion such entertainment personalities as Elizabeth Taylor, Richard Burton, Frank Si-
natra, Tom Jones and Steve McQueen.Id. Upon learning of the release, the trial court held an
in-chambers hearing to discover the identities of Farr's sources. Farr refused to disclose his
sources pursuant to CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070. Id. at 64-65, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 344. At that time,
the trial judge informed Farr that section 1070 would immunize him from contempt if he
published an article based on the statement. In re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 582, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 649, 652 (1974). Farr, after this discussion with the trial judge, published the article in
the Los Angeles Herald Examiner on Oct. 9, 1970.
78. The court's purpose for holding Farr in contempt was to supplement the record of
the Manson trial for appeal purposes and to prevent its officers and attaches from violating
court orders. In re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 583, II1 Cal. Rptr. 649, 653 (1974).
79. Farr v. Superior Ct., 22 Cal. App. 3d at 65-66, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 345. The contempt
order was stayed to permit Farr to pursue his writ of review to the appellate court.
80. Id. at 69, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
81. I Cal. 2d 630, 36 P.2d 369 (1934).
82. Farr v. Superior Ct., 22 Cal. App. 3d at 69, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
83. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
84. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). In Sheppard, a doctor was accused of murdering his wife. The
pretrial publicity by the news media was deemed to be so pervasive and prejudicial that it
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Supreme Court "mandate" to control prejudicial publicity. By con-
trolling prejudicial publicity in Farr, the court felt it could protect
and guarantee Manson and his codefendants a fair trial.85 As an
alternative to the Evidence Code immunity argument, Farr also
claimed that the first amendment protected him from divulging his
sources. The appellate court balanced the potential inhibition upon
the free flow of information and the defendant's right to a fair trial,
and concluded that there was an "undeniable need for disclosure."
Consequently, Farr was not protected by any first amendment
privilege.86
2. Rosato v. Superior Court"7
In Rosato, four Fresno Bee newsmen were held in contempt for
refusing to answer questions about the possible violation of the
court's protective and seal orders regarding a transcript of grand jury
testimony.8" The grand jury had indicted a city councilman, a land
developer, and the former city planning commissioner on counts of
bribery and conspiracy. After a change in venue was granted for the
councilman and land developer, the Fresno Bee published stories
about the investigation which quoted extensively from the sealed
transcript.88 In response to the apparent violation of its order, the
trial court held proceedings to determine who had violated its order
sealing the grand jury transcript. Three of the newsmen denied re-
ceiving a copy of the transcript from a person subject to the order.
Rosato, however, refused to answer questions as to how the Fresno
Bee obtained the transcript. All four newsmen were held in
contempt. 90
The appellate court in Rosato, like the Farr court, cited the
Sheppard mandate that the defendant's right to a fair trial, con-
ducted free of pretrial and trial publicity, was a preferred right on
the scale of constitutional values.9 Similarly, the appellate court sus-
tained the trial court's authority to investigate the possible violation
deprived the defendant of a fair trial consistent with the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
85. Farr, 22 Cal. App. 3d at 70, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
86. Id. at 71-73, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 349-50.
87. 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
88. Id. at 198-201, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 432-34. To ensure a fair and impartial trial, the
trial court ordered the grand jury transcripts sealed until the completion of the defendant's
trial and also issued an Order re Publicity. Id.
89. Id. at 199-201, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
90. Id at 201-05, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 434-36.
91. Id. at 205, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
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of its orders to protect the integrity of the judicial process, to assure
the proper administration of justice, and to perfect the trial record on
issues likely to arise on appeal.9"
In addressing the federal and state93 constitutional claims, the
court discussed the Branzburg decision and concluded that "the fair
trial guarantee to criminal defendants . . . is certainly entitled to
equal, if not greater, protection than criminal investigations by grand
juries . . . ."" The defendant's right to a fair trial outweighed the
conditional first amendment right to refuse to disclose sources.96
The pivotal issue involved addressed by the Rosato court in-
volved the scope of section 1070 immunity. The court determined
that the statute should be given a broad construction." Thereafter,
the court discussed the two limitations on the immunity contained in
section 1070. First, section 1070 was inapplicable if the newsman
participated in or witnessed criminal activity. 97 This was the pri-
mary exception created by the Rosato court. Second, section 1070
would not protect a newsman under circumstances similar to those in
Farr." However, the court held that the scope of the investigating
court's inquiry must be confined to questions which may tend to
identify those subject to and in possible violation of the court order.
The questions could not be so overbroad that they would reveal
other sources. Likewise, the court could not ask questions to discover
from where the information did not come. 99
92. Id. at 210, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 440.
93. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 2(a) provides, "[a] law may not restrain or abridge liberty of
speech or press." When a state claim equivalent to the federal first amendment is raised, the
same considerations used to construe the United States Constitution are applied to state consti-
tutional equivalents. Rosato, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 215, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
94. 51 Cal. App. 3d at 213, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
95. Id. at 214-15, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 443. The court rejected Justice Stewart's three-prong
test from his Branzburg dissent. In particular, the court spurned the requirement of exhaust-
ing alternative sources before seeking the confidential information from the newsman. Id. at
215-16, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 443-44.
96. Id. at 217, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 445. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
97. Rosato, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 219-22, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 446. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court drew an analogy to the other privileges, (for example, attorney-client, marital
communications and physician-patient) which provide exceptions for witnessing or participat-
ing in criminal conduct. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 956, 981, 997, 999 (West 1966 & Supp. 1984).
98. Rosato, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 219-22, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 446-48. See supra notes 76-83
and accompanying text.
99. Rosato, 51 Cal. App 3d at 224-25, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 450. This test is to be applied
on a question-by-question basis. Id. at 224-25 n.22, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 450 n.22.
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3. CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court00
On the evening of August 12, 1977, undercover agents of the
Santa Clara County Narcotics Bureau, in conjunction with a film
crew from CBS's "Sixty Minutes" program, attempted to film and
record a sale of the narcotic, PCP or "angel dust." In exchange for
allowing them to film the incident, CBS agreed that no film re-
vealing the agents' identities would be shown unless the officers' un-
dercover role had ended.'01 The defendants served a subpoena duces
tecum on CBS to produce certain video tapes, tape recordings and
motion pictures.1 2 Because the agents testified that they could
neither remember the words exchanged nor the sequence of such
words, and that their recollections would be refreshed by these "out-
takes,"' 08 the defendants argued that the discovery of the outtakes
was essential to their defense.'04 CBS moved to quash the subpoena
on several grounds: failure to show good cause, Evidence Code sec-
tion 1070, and the federal and California constitution freedom of
press provisions. The trial court denied CBS's motion, finding that
the defendants had made the requisite showing of good cause and
that their right to a fair trial outweighed CBS's asserted rights. Ac-
cordingly, CBS was ordered to produce "any and all video and audio
tapes, photographs, transcriptions of any tapes, outtakes or any other
films" from that evening.' 5
The appellate court first addressed CBS's section 1070 priv-
ilege claim. CBS claimed a vicarious interest in maintaining the con-
fidentiality of the agents pursuant to their agreement. However, all
three officers had revealed their identities and roles at the motion
hearing. Because the identity of the sources was no longer confiden-
tial, the court held that the underlying purpose of section
1070-protecting confidential sources-was lost and thus was
inapplicable."0
In considering CBS's constitutional pleas, the court held that
the criminal defendant need only demonstrate a "reasonable possibil-
100. 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1978).
101. Id. at 248, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
102. Id. at 246, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
103. "Outtakes" are the audio and video (or film) tapes prepared for a news segment
but which are ultimately not used and therefore, are unpublished. They are specifically in-
cluded in the definition of "unpublished information" under CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b). See
supra note I.
104. CBS, Inc., 85 Cal. App. 3d at 248, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
105. Id. at 246-47, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
106. Id. at 250, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
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ity that evidence sought to be discovered might result in his exonera-
tion.' 1 0 7 The press, on the other hand, had a constitutionally pro-
tected right of news gathering.'09 The court reached a laudable
balance between these interests, requiring the trial court to examine
the subpoenaed materials in camera and to determine which evi-
dence would be necessary to the parties' defense. After this determi-
nation, the trial court could limit the material to the audio tapes
because only the discussions were at issue. Further, if the video tapes
and films had to be shown, the agents' faces could be blocked out to
conceal their identities.'0 9 Thus, although the CBS court created an-
other exception to section 1070, that section 1070 was inapplicable
when the confidential sources' identities were revealed, the court did
restore constitutional respect and protection for the news gathering
process by requiring editing of the subpoenaed material.
4. Hammarley v. Superior Court"0
In 1977, John Hammarley, a reporter for the Sacramento
Union newspaper, published four articles about the "Mexican Ma-
fia," implicating certain defendants in the murder of Ellen Delia.
Hammarley made tape recordings, notes and summaries of various
interviews with his primary source, Edward Gonzales, in addition to
discussions with other confidential corroborating sources."' At the
criminal trial, the defendants subpoenaed Hammarley to appear as a
witness and to produce any recordings, transcripts or notes from his
interviews with Gonzales. The defendants claimed that the material
was "necessary for the impeachment of [Gonzales] the prosecution's
primary witness." '1 Hammarley moved to quash the subpoena
based on section 1070. The trial court ordered Hammarley to pro-
duce for in camera inspection all material concerning the Gonzales
interviews. Hammarley refused to comply with the order; he was
then cited for contempt and ordered committed to the county jail.
This order, however, was stayed pending review by the appellate
107. Id. at 251, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 427 (citing People v. Borunda, 11 Cal. 3d 523, 522
P.2d 1, 113 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1974) and Honore v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 162, 449 P.2d 169,
74 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1969)).
108. CBS, 85 Cal. App. 3d at 251, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 426-27.
109. Id. at 253, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
110. 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979).
111. Id. at 392-93, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 610. The trial court sustained Hammarley's as-
serted privilege to avoid disclosure of his corroborating sources.
112. Id. Gonzales, a self-confessed former member of the Mexican Mafia, participated
in Delia's murder. He received immunity in exchange for his testimony. Gonzales assumed a
new identity and left the state.
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court. 13
Evincing a genuine respect for section 1070 and its objectives,
the appellate court fashioned additional standards for analyzing the
conflict between a section 1070 claim and the defendant's right to a
fair trial. The Hammarley court held that the party seeking to inval-
idate section 1070's immunity had the burden of demonstrating that
the evidence sought was both relevant and necessary to his case, and
that such evidence was not available from a less intrusive source.1 4
After analyzing the defendants' need for information pertaining to
the Hammarley-Gonzales interview, the court concluded that the de-
fendants had satisfied their burden.1 5 The court then considered
Hammarley's claim. The court reasoned that because no pledge of
confidentiality had been sought by or given to Gonzales, there was
no concrete need for confidentiality."' Also, Hammarley had made
no effort to show a specific need for enforcing his section 1070 right,
other than claiming that his information fell within the statute's pro-
tective purview.1 7 Finding only a "speculative and uncertain" bur-
den on the news gathering process, and no legislative objectives to be
served, the court rejected Hammarley's claim in favor of the defend-
ant's demonstrated need for the materials."'
AfterFarr, Rosato, CBS and Hammarley there were four situa-
tions in which section 1070 would not shield newsmen. First, Farr
held that if the effect of section 1070 was to interfere with a court's
control of its officers and proceedings, the court could disregard the
immunity and hold the newsman in contempt." 9 Second, Rosato
held that if the newsman had participated in or had witnessed crimi-
nal activity, he would not be shielded.' 20 Third, CBS held that if the
confidential source had voluntarily revealed his identity, the statute
would not apply because its purpose was no longer served.1 " Fi-
nally, Hammarley held that a defendant's demonstrable need for a
newsman's material to insure the sixth amendment's guarantee of a
fair trial superceded a vague, generalized assertion of a section 1070
113. Id. at 394, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 610-11.
114. Id. at 399, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 614. Thus, Justice Stewart's three-pronged constitu-
tional test from Branzburg appears to be fully incorporated into the § 1070 balancing process.
See supra note 95.
115. Hammarley, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 400, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 614-15.
116. Id. at 400-01, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 402, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
119. Farr v. Superior Ct., 22 Cal. App. 3d at 69, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
120. Rosato, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 219-22, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
121. CBS, 85 Cal. App. 3d at 250, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
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privilege.122 Ironically, the protection of the statute expanded as
these exceptions were being carved out due to an increased judicial
awareness of the news gathering process.
128
These cases, in addition to the federal constitutional case law,
provide the background to the incorporation of Evidence Code sec-
tion 1070 into the California Constitution as article I, section 2(b).
The cases indicate judicial sensitivity to the newsman and his profes-
sional responsibilities, along with judicial unwillingness to interfere
with the dissemination of news. Yet, each time a conflict arose be-
tween the newsmen's privilege and a significant competing interest,
the privilege was set aside and the newsman was compelled, on pain
of contempt and incarceration, to divulge his information.
III. THE INCORPORATION: THE NEWSMEN'S "NEW" PROTECTION
A. California Constitution Article I, Section 2(b)
On June 3, 1980, the California voters passed Proposition 5,124
and thereby incorporated Evidence Code section 1070 into the Cali-
fornia Constitution. The new amendment was nearly identical to its
progenitor, section 1070. From those slight changes that did occur, it
is not possible to infer any legislative intent." 5 As does Evidence
Code section 1070, article I, section 2(b) suffers from a lack of legis-
lative history. There is no legislative comment explaining how the
amendment alters or increases the degree of protection afforded
newsmen in a civil or criminal proceeding.'" However, the Official
Ballot Pamphlet, which is considered the "functional equivalent of
the legislative history," provides insight into the intent of the
122. Hammarley, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 400-02, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 614-16.
123. The immunity "encompasses all information acquired by the newsman in the
course of his professional activities which he has not disseminated to the public." Id. at 397-
98, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
124. ASSEMBLY CONSTITUTIONAL AMEND. No. 4 (1978 Cal. Stat. 77).
125. The only significant change is that § 1070 reads "cannot be adjudged in contempt,"
while art. I, §2(b) reads "shall not be adjudged in contempt." For purposes of statutory con-
struction, the two terms, "cannot" and "shall not," are equivalent. Gleason v. Spray, 81 Cal.
217, 220, 22 P. 551, 552 (1889). Perhaps, "shall not" is even a weaker directive, sometimes
being construed as permissive rather than mandatory. Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co., 33 Cal.
2d 564, 573, 203 P.2d 758, 764 (1949); Hogya v. Superior Court of San Diego County 75
Cal. App. 3d 122, 134, 142 Cal. Rptr. 325, 333 (1977). See generally 58 CAL. JUR. STAT-
UTES § 147 (1980). In any event, slight changes in statutory phraseology incidental to the
amendment or revision of a statute are usually construed as a clarification rather than a change
in meaning. See Hammond v. McDonald, 49 Cal. App. 2d 671, 681,122 P.2d 332, 338 (1942);
County of Sacramento v. City of Sacramento, 75 Cal. App. 2d 436, 443, 171 P.2d 477, 481
(1946).
126. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b).
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measure.127
The published argument in favor of Proposition 5 presents an
impassioned plea to assure "freedom in America" by protecting
newsmen from incarceration, either real or threatened. 2 According
to the argument, Proposition 5 was intended to reverse the recent
judicial trend of carving out exceptions to section 1070. The central
concern espoused in the ballot argument is maintaining a "free flow
of information to the public."' 29 Sources would not come forward
because the reporter's pledge of confidentiality would be suspect
under the threat of imprisonment. Drying up these sources would
impair the flow of information, thus jeopardizing "our democratic
form of government."' 0 Unfortunately, no argument opposing Pro-
position 5 was submitted. This can be explained by the fact that only
an infinitesimal constituency opposed the policy of granting confiden-
tiality to news sources. Generally, the conflict arises only when a
criminal defendant or a defamation plaintiff needs a newsman's in-
formation or the identity of his source. To determine whether the
legislature intended the immunity in article I, section 2(b) to be ab-
solute and, hence, not subject to competing interests,'' judges and
lawyers should consider one particular sentence of the official argu-
ment in favor of Proposition 5: "By giving existing law constitutional
status, judges will have to give the protection greater weight before
attempting to compel reporters to breach their pledges of confidenti-
ality."'182 The obvious inference is that the protection was not in-
tended to be absolute. Judges should accord the newsmen's immunity
"greater weight," but the immunity can be outweighed by significant
competing interests.
127. Schmitz v. Younger, 21 Cal. 3d 90, 97 n.2, 577 P.2d 652, 656 n.2, 145 Cal. Rptr.
517, 521 n.2 (1978) (Manuel, J., dissenting); White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775 n.l, 533 P.2d
222, 234 n.ll, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 106 n.l (1975). However, these ballot arguments are not
controlling. California Inst. of Technology v. Johnson, 55 Cal. App. 2d 856, 859, 132 P.2d 61,
63 (1942).
128. Pamphlet, supra note 7, at 19.
129. Id.
130. Id. One might speculate that these were legitimate concerns upon which post-
Watergate voters relied when passing Proposition 5.
131. This was argued by Mr. Kaye's attorney, Edward P. Davis. See infra notes 147-54
and accompanying text. Petitioner's Brief at 24, Kaye v. Superior Court (a pretrial hearing)
(real parties in interest, People v. Hillestad, No. 88569 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, Cal.
1984)) [hereinafter cited as Brief].
132. Pamphlet, supra note 7, at 19 (emphasis added).
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B. Applicability of the Farr, Rosato, CBS and Hammarley
Exceptions
A significant issue surrounding the new constitutional shield
law is the applicability of the Farr, Rosato, CBS and Hammarley
exceptions.1 " In terms of the general applicability of these four ex-
ceptions, it is usually presumed that when reenacting a statute or
amendment, the Legislature is familiar with the related common law
rules, previous acts and the existing judicial decisions which construe
the original statute. " 4 In addition to this presumption, it would ap-
pear that the legislature in enacting article I, section 2(b) was in fact
aware of the judicial exceptions because the legislative analyst's
statement and the argument in the Official Ballot referred to the ex-
ceptions. Moreover, members of the California Legislature authored
the argument for Proposition 5 ." Thus, if the Legislature was
aware of these exceptions and if they were so onerous as to merit
alteration or repeal, why did not the Legislature, in proposing article
I, section 2(b), expressly overrule these exceptions to Evidence Code
section 1070? One possible answer is that the Legislature did not
intend to alter or overrule the existing exceptions, but rather it
wanted to halt the recent trend of court-created exceptions. For in-
stance, the official argument in the ballot pamphlet stated that
"judges will have to give the protection greater weight.""" It would
appear that after article I, section 2(b) was amended, the immunity
was intended to be much stronger, though not absolute.
In addition, when legislation has been judicially construed and
a similar subsequent statute is enacted, courts have consistently pre-
sumed that the legislature intended to adopt the prior judicial con-
struction.1 87 The exception, of course, is when the legislature ex-
133. See supra note 6.
134. Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 625, 470 P.2d 617, 619, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481,
483 (1970); People v. Welch, 20 Cal. App. 3d 997, 1002, 98 Cal. Rptr. 113, 116 (1971).
135. State Congressman Jerry Lewis and Assemblyman Charles R. Imbrecht in addi-
tion to Robert Rawitch authored the argument in favor of Proposition 5. Pamphlet, supra note
7, 18-19.
136. See Pamphlet, supra note 7, at 19.
137. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Skelley, 18 Cal. 3d 365, 369, 556 P.2d 297, 300, 134
Cal. Rptr. 197, 200 (1976) (quoting Mattern v. Carberry, 186 Cal. App. 2d 570, 573, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 137, 139 (1960)); Lightner Mining Co. v. Lane, 161 Cal. 689, 700,120 P. 771, 776 (1911);
Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 54 Cal. 2d 684,
688, 355 P.2d 905, 907, 8 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1960); State Comm'n in Lunacy v. Welch, 154 Cal.
775, 777, 99 P. 181, 182 (1908); State Director of Employment v. General Ins. Co., 13 Cal. App.
3d 853, 860, 96 Cal. Rptr. 744, 748 (1970); Nishikawa Farms, Inc. v. Mahony, 66 Cal. App.
3d 781, 787, 136 Cal. Rptr. 233, 236 (1970); Lindsay Strathmore Irrig. Dist. v. Superior Court
of Tulare County, 182 Cal. 315, 333, 187 P. 1056,1063 (1920); Holmes v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d
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presses a contrary intent. 3 8 Once again however, analysis of article
1, section 2(b) will be fragmentary; the only form of legislative his-
tory is that embodied in the legislative analyst's statement and the
ballot argument in favor of Proposition 5. The legislative analyst
merely recognized that the exceptions existed.' 8 9 The argument in
favor of Proposition 5 went a little further, citing the the exceptions
as a threat to the free flow of information to the public."" One may
conclude from those statements that Proposition 5 was a direct re-
sponse to the Farr, Rosato, CBS and Hammarley exceptions. How-
ever, to conclude that these statements represent legislative intent to
significantly alter or overrule the exceptions requires a considerable
interpretive leap. Absent evidence of contrary intent, the rules of
statutory construction would generally hold that the four exceptions
should apply to article I, section 2(b).
In terms of the specific exceptions, Rosato, CBS and Ham-
marley should apply, not only because of the rules of statutory con-
struction, but also because they are based on sound policy considera-
tions. The Rosato exception, which held section 1070 inapplicable if
the newsman had participated in or witnessed criminal activity,"' is
based on those Evidence Code provisions which invalidate privileges
if the confidential relationship was undertaken to plan or commit a
crime." 2 The CBS exception, which deemed section 1070 inapplica-
ble when the newsman's confidential sources voluntarily revealed
their identities,"' is justified because once the source's identity is re-
vealed, the statute's purpose is no longer served by continued nondis-
closure. The Hammarley exception, which held that a demonstrable
need for a newsman's material to insure a fair trial would supercede
a vague, generalized assertion of section 1070's privilege,", is based
on the fundamental right to a fair trial.
Conversely, the Farr exception and Rosato to the extent it is
based on Farr, should not apply to article 1, section 2(b). Farr was
decided on separation of powers grounds; the court would not toler-
ate an unconstitutional interference by the Legislature with the
426, 430, 110 P.2d 428, 430, cert. denied, 314 U.S. 636 (1941); Rosemary Properties, Inc., v.
McColgan, 29 Cal. 2d 677, 687, 177 P.2d 757, 764 (1947).
138. Playboy Enters. v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 24, 201 Cal. Rptr. 207, 215
(1984).
139. Pamphlet, supra note 7, at 18.
140. d. at 19.
141. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
142. Id.
143. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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court's power to control its officers and proceedings. 45 Article I, sec-
tion 2(b), however, is now an amendment to the California Constitu-
tion. Constitutional amendments cannot violate the separation of
powers doctrine because the constitution creates the executive, legis-
lative and judicial powers.1 46 Thus, California courts can no longer
invalidate the newsmen's privilege based on separation of powers
grounds.
C. Kaye v. Superior Court
47
On October 22, 1982, the San Jose Mercury News reported an
interview by Jeff Kaye with Los Altos Hills councilmember Lucile
Hillestad and her husband, Donald.1 48 In the interview, the Hilles-
tads admitted falsifying real estate documents and accepting money
from an undercover agent to bribe town officials. The Hillestads
were subsequently charged with attempted bribery and conspir-
acy. 1 49 During the pretrial hearing, the prosecution subpoenaed
Kaye, essentially to confirm the statements and conclusions expressed
in his article. Kaye testified with respect to the published informa-
tion only. The Hillestads' attorneys subjected Kaye to wide-ranging
cross-examination. Kaye however, refused to answer questions that
could have revealed his confidential sources or unpublished informa-
tion. His refusal was based on section 1070, article I, section 2(b)
and the first amendment. The Hillestads then claimed that they were
being denied their right to a fair trial because they could not prop-
erly cross-examine Kaye. As a result, the judge ordered Kaye to sup-
ply his notes for an in camera inspection. 5
This scenario typifies the circumstances which lead to a conflict
between the press and the criminal defendant. As in Kaye's case, it is
145. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
146. See CAL. CONST. art. II1, § 3 (West 1983). "The powers of state government are
legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not
exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution." Id. (emphasis added).
147. When ordered to turn over his information, reporter Jeff Kaye immediately filed
an appeal to the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District under the case name Kaye v.
Superior Court. Because the superior court resolved the dispute, which it did in a hearing, the
case never received a case number. At this time the hearing transcript is unavailable. Thus, all
references to the hearing and pre-trial hearing will be cited to an interview conducted on Jan.
II, 1985 with Edward P. Davis, attorney for the San Jose Mercury News and Jeff Kaye [here-
inafter cited as Interview].
148. Kaye, Councilwoman Snared in D.A.'s Sting, San Jose Mercury News, Oct. 22,
1982, at Al, col. I.
149. Shepard, Ex-Mercury Reporter Won't have to Testify at Hillestad Bribery Trial,
San Jose Mercury News, Oct. 31, 1984 at 2B, col. I.
150. Interview, supra note 147.
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often the prosecutor who subpoenas the reporter merely to "confirm"
an article, or to "do the work that their investigators either have not
[done] or cannot do."15 Next, the defense subjects the reporter to
extensive cross-examination, delving into information that the re-
porter refuses to disclose. The defense then voices vigorous com-
plaints; some of these are genuine but often the defense is creating a
"strawman issue" that will provide grounds for an appeal.' 52 In
evaluating the defendant's and newsman's interests, judges should be
aware of such practices, ferreting out whether there is a genuine
need for the newsman's information. In the Hillestads' case, it is
difficult to envision a genuine need for Kaye's information regarding
the interview because the Hillestads were present at the interview.
At the in camera hearing, which was convened soley to deter-
mine whether Kaye was required to turn over his notes, the judge
was placed in the unenviable position of balancing the interests of
the prosecution, the defense and Kaye. The judge ultimately ruled
that Kaye's testimony and article and any reference to them were
inadmissible evidence for several reasons. First, admission of Kaye's
testimony into evidence would have consumed an undue amount of
time." 8 Second, at the pretrial hearing the judge had already sus-
tained a number of Kaye's objections, and thus had curtailed the
defense's ability to adequately cross-examine Kaye. 54
The judge's decision to exclude Kaye's testimony was laudable
indeed because it evinced respect for both the reporter's rights under
article I, section 2(b) and for the defendant's right to a fair trial.
Excluding the reporter's testimony entirely is a solution that should
be considered by judges in the future, although it is clear that differ-
ent circumstances will not always permit such a resolution. The next
section will set forth the various arguments asserted by the press and
the criminal defendant when the two interests come in conflict.
151. Id. Davis has argued six cases involving newsmen being ordered to provide infor-
mation. Davis said he is frustrated with prosecuting attorneys who use reporters to obtain
information that is often unnecessary or is attainable elsewhere. Bob Ingle, executive editor of
the Mercury News also voiced this complaint. "The district attorney's office ought to get the
message that they will have to prove their own case without hauling our reporters into court."
Shepard,supra note 149, at 2B.
152. Interview, supra note 147.
153. Id. Both the prosecution and the defense had to know if Kaye's testimony, article
and notes could be used in order to structure their arguments. Considering the time consumed
at the pretrial and in chamber hearing, it became apparent that Kaye's testimony would ex-
pend too much time.
154. Id.
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D. The Competing Interests
1. The Press and the Free Flow of Information
The heart of any claim of privilege against compelled disclosure
lies within the first amendment. The purpose of the first amendment
is to maintain an uninhibited marketplace of ideas from which the
truth may be ascertained." More important than the rights con-
ferred to the press, however, are the rights of the public to have
access to social, political, esthetic, and moral and other ideas and
experiences.' 56 The press frequently asserts that interference with
the newsman in the course of his profession is not only an infringe-
ment upon his right as a journalist, but also violates the public's
right to have facts and opinions bearing on public issues. Unfortu-
nately, the intangible nature of this right tends to cause judges to
mitigate its importance when they are confronted with a criminal
defendant's "imminent" need for information. Yet, interference with
the dissemination of news does have a debilitating impact when one
considers the important role of the press. As the United States Su-
preme Court stated: "The free press has been a mighty catalyst in
awakening public interest in governmental affairs, exposing corrup-
tion among public officers and employees and generally informing
the citizenry of public events and occurrences, including court
proceedings.'
1 57
The question then arises, how does compulsory disclosure of
confidential news sources interfere with the reporter's dissemination
of news? The press has cited two ways: sources, vital 58 to effective
news gathering, are dried up because the reporter cannot adequately
guarantee his pledge of confidentiality, and future investigation is
generally deterred by loss of sources and threat of contempt cita-
tions. " 9 First, the press contends that absent a guarantee of anonym-
ity, a source will not come forward with sensitive information 60
because he fears that the subpoenaed newsman will reveal his iden-
tity. 6 ' In the case, In re Caldwell, 62 one of the four precursors to
155. Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
156. Id.
157. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
158. Blasi, The Newsmen's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REv. 229, 245-
46 (1971).
159. Comment, The Newsmen's Qualified Privilege: An Analytical Approach, 16 CAL.
W.L. RE v. 331, 339-43 (1980).
160. Note, Branzburg Revisited: The Continuing Search for a Testimonial Privilege
for Newsmen, 11 TultSA L.J. 258, 260 (1975).
161. Comment, supra note 159, at 340.
162. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972).
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Branzburg, nineteen notable journalists' submitted affidavits stat-
ing that sources would not provide information without such a prom-
ise of anonymity. However, Justice White in Branzburg rejected
these affidavits and other studies as self-serving, viewing them as
"widely divergent and to a great extent speculative.""' 4 Justice Stew-
art, in response to this cursory rejection, maintained that even
though the percentages may not be overwhelming, many people will
undeniably be deterred from providing information to newsmen and
the flow of news will "inevitably be impaired.""'
The second claim the press asserted was that future investiga-
tion is deterred by compulsory disclosure.' 66 The newsman is un-
doubtedly deterred from seeking information that may later be re-
quested by a court of law. Contempt citations, the cost of litigation
and the threat of imprisonment intimidate and impede newsmen in
the execution of their day-to-day responsibilities."" If a newsman is
aware that certain sensitive information will be sought, he may forgo
gathering or publishing the information to avoid "three equally dis-
concerting possibilities: 1) breaching his pledge of confidentiality,
and thereby breaching his journalistic code of ethics, 2) receiving a
contempt citation, and thereby breaching his personal code of ethics
or, 3) being incarcerated.' 68 The Second Circuit recognized the sig-
nificance of this argument in Baker v. F.& F. Investment.'69 "The
deterrent effect such disclosure is likely to have upon future 'under-
cover' investigative reporting . . . threatens freedom of the press and
the public's need to be informed."' The Baker court accordingly
refused to order discovery.' 7 '
In sum, the press regards itself as both a purveyor of vital infor-
mation and as the watchdog of society. It relies heavily on confiden-
tial sources to fulfill its duties. Interference with the reporter-source
relationship infringes upon the rights of journalists and the public's
right to have access to otherwise unavailable sensitive information.
163. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 736 n.20 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Some
of these journalists included Walter Cronkite, Dan Rather, Eric Sevareid, Mike Wallace and
Marvin Kalb.
164. Id. at 693-94 and nn.31-33.
165. Id. at 735 n.18 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
166. Comment, supra note 159, at 341.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 342.
169. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
170. Id. at 782. See also Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
171. Baker, 470 F.2d at 783.
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2. Criminal Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial
A basic principle of our judicial system is that witnesses prop-
erly summoned before a court must testify unless they have a privi-
lege. 172 The reason for this requirement is that justice prevails if all
information is revealed.' The right to every man's evidence is par-
ticularly acute in a criminal proceeding, when the consequences of
an improper conviction could be devastating. When the defendant
demonstrates a need for information held by the newsman, he will
assert his sixth amendment right to obtain witnesses and to a fair
trial and, in California, he would also assert his state constitutional
right under article I, section 15.7 4 Both the United States Supreme
Court and the California Supreme Court have recognized the impor-
tance of these rights. In Chambers v. Mississippi 78 the United States
Supreme Court observed that:
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in
essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the
State's accusations. The rights to confront and cross examine
witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf have long
been recognized as essential to due process. 176
Similarly, the California Supreme Court has recognized that the
criminal defendant is "entitled" to a fair trial, including all relevant
and reasonably accessible information.1 7 7 The thrust of these deci-
sions is obvious; but what showing must the criminal defendant
make to rival or override a legitimate article I, section 2(b) privilege?
The most recent case addressing this conflict, Hammarley v. Su-
perior Court,37 required a qualitative evaluation of the defendant's
claim. 179 The standards set by the Hammarley court placed the bur-
den of proof on the party seeking to avoid the privilege-the crimi-
nal defendant. The defendant was required to establish that the evi-
dence was relevant and necessary to his case, and was not available
172. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2190-2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
173. People ex. rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 293, 199 N.E. 415, 416 (1936).
174. The sixth amendment to the Constitution provides that "the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses .. " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Similarly, CAL. CONST. art. 1, §6 provides that "[t]he defendant in a criminal case has the
right . . . to compel attendance of witnesses in the defendant's behalf. ... CAL. CONST.
art. 1, § 15.
175. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
176. Id. at 294.
177. Pitchess v. Superior Court, I1 Cal. 3d 531, 535, 522 P.2d 305, 308, 113 Cal. Rptr.
897, 900 (1974).
178. 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979).
179. Id. at 399, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
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from a less intrusive source. Further, the defendant was required to
show a reasonable possibility that the information sought would re-
sult in his exoneration.1 80 Although more exacting than Branzburg
or Rosato, which did not require exhaustion of less intrusive sources,
the Hammarley standard is still relatively easy to satisfy.18 This
probably reflects the importance of ensuring that the criminal de-
fendant receives a fair trial. From the criminal defendant's perspec-
tive, a newsman must disclose any relevant evidence in order to ef-
fectuate the fair administration of justice. This concern was echoed
by the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Nixon: 2 "The ends of criminal
justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a par-
tial or speculative presentation of the facts."' 83
E. Recent Case Law
1. California
Since the incorporation of Evidence Code section 1070 into the
California Constitution, only three civil cases 84 and the Kaye hear-
ing have addressed the import of the newly enacted article I, section
2(b). These civil cases have limited applicability in the criminal con-
text,' 8' but they provide helpful interpretation.
In the most recent case, Mitchell v. Superior Court,'" the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court set forth a balancing test 87 to be used in defa-
mation suits against reporters who claim a first amendment qualified
privilege. Before reaching this issue, the court noted that in a crimi-
180. Id.
181. Compare these standards with Justice Stewart's tripartite test in Branzburg (see
supra note 59'and accompanying text), or with Judge Franson's five-part analysis in Rosato
(see infra note 222 and accompanying text).
182. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
183. Id. at 709.
184. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 690 P.2d 625, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152
(1984); KSDO v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1982); Playboy
Enters. v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 201 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1984).
185. See KSDO v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 385, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211, 217
(1982). In criminal cases, the public interest in law enforcement creates a substantial public
need for disclosure. However, in civil cases, when the public interest in requiring disclosure is
less compelling, a stronger first amendment protection is applied.
186. 37 Cal. 3d 268, 690 P.2d 625, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1984).
187. Id. at 279-84, 690 P.2d at 632-35, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 159-62. The test was adopted
from KSDO v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1982). It has four
components: I) the nature of the proceeding (civil or criminal); 2) the status of the newsman
(party or nonparty); 3) alternative sources of information; and 4) the relationship of the infor-
mation to the heart of the claim. Id. 136 Cal. App. 3d at 385, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 217. These
components were derived from three cases previously discussed, Garland, Caldwell and the
Branzburg dissent.
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nal proceeding, both the interest of the state in law enforcement and
the defendant's interest in discovering exonerating evidence outweigh
any such interests asserted in ordinary civil litigation. 8 Thus, the
court's discussion of what standards must be met in a civil action is
wholly inapplicable to a criminal proceeding.
KSDO v. Superior Court,1"9 upon which the Mitchell decision
was largely based, involved a libel action against a radio station, its
owner, and an employee. The defendants opposed a motion to pro-
duce documents, asserting their rights under section 1070, article I,
section 2(b), and the United States Constitution. 90 In dismissing the
defendant's argument that article I, section 2(b) provided an absolute
privilege against testifying, 91 the court stated that the amendment
"provides no more of a privilege than did section 1070 of the Evi-
dence Code.""' 2 The import of this statement, however, was later
diluted by the court as it explicitly refused to discuss the effects of
the amendment."' The defendants were ultimately granted relief
based on the first amendment of the federal Constitution and were
not required to produce the documents. 94 The significance of the
case, however, was the implication that a nonparty newsman could
be compelled to testify in a civil suit, even though the public need for
disclosure is much less compelling than in a criminal context." 5 This
demonstrates how the post-article I, section 2(b) judiciary is still un-
willing to afford newsmen an absolute immunity.
In contrast, the court in Playboy Enterprises v. Superior
Court"' took serious objection to KSDO's evisceration of article I,
section 2(b). 97 The Playboy court predicted that such a rule would
reduce or wholly vitiate the protection afforded by article I, section
188. Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d at 278, 690 P.2d at 631, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
189. 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1982).
190. 136 Cal. App. 3d at 379, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
191. 136 Cal. App. 3d at 379, 384, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 213, 216. In ruling on the matter,
the appellate court echoed the Assembly Judiciary Committee's caveat that § 1070 does not
create a privilege against testifying. Section 1070 only provides an immunity against being
adjudged in contempt. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 1070 (West 1966). Thus, § 1070 would not
prevent a court from imposing other discovery sanctions against a newsman when he is a party
to civil litigation and refuses to comply with discovery. KDSO, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 380, 186
Cal. Rptr. at 214.
192. KSDO, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 381-82, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
193. 136 Cal. App. 3d at 383, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 216. In fact, the entire issue was ren-
dered moot, as the court ultimately held § 1070 inapplicable because the defendants were
neither threatened with, nor cited for contempt. Id. at 384, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
194. Id. at 385-86, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 217-18.
195. Id.
196. 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 201 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1984).
197. Id. at 27, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
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2(b)."'8 Recognizing the significance of elevating the newsmen's pro-
tection to state constitutional status, the court equated article I, sec-
tion 2(b)'s protection to other Evidence Code privileges. The court
resoundingly declared that "the state has no interest and that civil
litigants have no constitutional or other rights sufficient to overcome
this constitutional protection. '""' This affirmation of the newsmen's
rights under article I, section 2(b) will certainly assuage journalistic
fears of contempt orders in the civil context, but its effect will obvi-
ously be limited in the criminal context.
2. Federal and Other States' Laws
Since the amendment of California's shield law, no significant
change has occurred in the federal law with respect to a first amend-
ment privilege. It appears fairly entrenched that a qualified privilege
exists.2"' The only federal case addressing article I, section 2(b) is
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL,2"' in which
the court cited the Hammarley test with approval.20 2 This lends
credence to the application of the Rosato, CBS and Hammarley ex-
ceptions20 8 to article I, section 2(b). Other than this however, the
case provides little in terms of substantive interpretation of the new
amendment.
At this time, twenty-six states20' have some form of newsmen's
privilege. Only Montana and New York, however, have a statute
similar to California's which provides an immunity from being ad-
198. Id.
199. Id. at 27-28, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 218-19.
200. See supra note 65.
201. 89 F.R.D. 489 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
202. Id. at 495. For the Hammarley test, see supra note 114 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 134-45 and accompanying text.
204. ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.150 (1973); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070
(West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 §§ 4320-4326 (1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §§
8-901 to 8-909 (Smith-Hurd 1983) (repealed 1982); IND. CODE § 34-3-5-1 (Supp. 1983); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Baldwin 1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-1451 to -1454 (West
1982); MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1980); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.945(l)
(Callaghan 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-025 (West Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 26-1-901 to 903 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to 146 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275
(1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to 21.13, -29 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983-84); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (Supp. 1978); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976 & Supp.
1982-1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (Page
1981); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506 (1980); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (1981); 42 PA. CON.
STAT. ANN. § 5942 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to -3 (Supp. 1983); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980).
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judged in contempt. 0 5 New York's highest court recently ruled on its
state shield law in Beach v. Shanley.206
In Beach, the New York Court of Appeals examined the legis-
lative intent surrounding the enactment of New York's shield law
and the subsequent amendments that responded to "judicial circum-
scriptions of the statute. ' 20 7 One of these amendments expressly pro-
hibited grand juries from pursuing contempt proceedings against re-
porters.208 The court, finding neither qualifying language in the
statute nor a distinction between criminal and civil matters, deter-
mined that courts could not ignore the legislature's mandate and sub-
stitute their own policies.20 9
The New York Court of Appeals chose to interpret the shield
law as affording newsmen an absolute immunity from contempt, un-
less exceptions existed.210 It is difficult, however, to determine to
which "exceptions" the court referred. In any event, the court was
undeniably motivated by the specific legislative responses to the
"loopholes" and "gaps" created by the judiciary. The Beach case in-
dicates that it is possible to provide newsmen an absolute immunity
from contempt in the criminal context.
IV. THE APPROPRIATE STANDARDS
A. Absolute or...
When the California electorate amended the state constitution
with article I, section 2(b), it manifested an unequivocal intent "to
afford newsmen the highest level of protection under state law." '
In terms of the nature of the immunity, California's shield law is
absolute rather than qualified. For example, the Illinois code states
that the reporter need not disclose the information unless "all other
available sources of information have been exhausted and disclosure
of the information sought is essential to the protection of the public
interest involved." 2 2 This language explicitly permits Illinois courts
to weigh the interests involved. California's shield law, however,
contains no provision for judicial balancing, nor for distinguishing
205. Montana has no case law to provide guidance in the interpretation of CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 2(b).
206. 62 N.Y.2d 241, 465 N.E.2d 304, 476 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1984).
207. Id. at 250, 465 N.E.2d at 308, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 769.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 251-52, 465 N.E.2d at 310, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 771.
210. Id.
211. Playboy Enters., 154 Cal. App. 3d at 27, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
212. ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 110, § 8-907(2) (Smith-Hurd 1983).
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between civil and criminal proceedings. 1 A tenable conclusion,
then, would be that under article I, section 2(b) the California news
media has an absolute immunity from contempt orders for refusing
discovery, whether or not a criminal defendant needs the newsman's
information for his defense.
However, numerous vexing questions, in addition to the rules of
statutory construction, lead to the conclusion that the newsman is not
guaranteed an absolute protection. Rather, he is entitled to a greater
protection which can only be outweighed by substantial competing
interests. Several reasons support this conclusion.
First, article I, section 2(b) was clearly enacted as a response to
the Farr, Rosato, CBS and Hammarley exceptions.21 4 Yet, the text
of article I, section 2(b) makes no reference to the exceptions or how
the amendment affects them. If the legislature's intent was to alter or
repeal the exceptions, some comment in the official ballot pamphlet
or accompanying the amendment should have been provided.2"5 Sec-
ond, the official argument in favor of Proposition 5 states that the
immunity would be given "greater weight" by the judiciary "before
attempting to compel" disclosure."' The inference is that under cer-
tain circumstances the reporter may be compelled to divulge sensitive
information. Third, the rules of statutory construction hold that if
legislation has been judicially construed and a similar statute or
amendment is later enacted without reference to that construction, it
will be presumed that the legislature intended to adopt the prior con-
struction.""' If the legislature expresses intent contrary to the judicial
construction however, that intent prevails. Yet, no evidence of intent
exists other than the official argument, which supports the conclu-
sion that the protection is not absolute. Finally, with respect to the
specific judicial exceptions and their applicability, Farr"' (and
Rosato219 to the extent that it supports Farr) is the only exception
that should not apply. The Farr exception was based on a violation
of the separation of powers doctrine. However, because the shield
law is now a part of the constitution, this basis is no longer valid.
213. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b).
214. See supra note 6.
215. Conversely, the New York court in Beach could point to the legislature's specific
act of removing the grand jury's power to cite reporters for contempt. Beach, 62 N.Y.2d at
250, 465 N.E.2d at 308, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 769.
216. Pamphlet, supra note 7, at 19.
217. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
218. 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
219. 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
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However, the Rosato, CBS220 and Hammarley2t exceptions are
based on sound policy considerations, and therefore, should still ap-
ply. The only issue that remains is what standards should be used to
determine when, if at all, the newsman should be compelled to dis-
close information.
B. The Balancing Test
To effectuate the will of the people, a balancing test that maxi-
mizes the reporter's interests is necessary. The proposed test comes
from Justice Franson's concurrence and dissent in the Rosato
case.222 The factors which should be weighed are:
1. The existence of alternate sources for the information;
2. The relevance of the inquiry;
3. The public interest served by disclosure;
4. The potential chilling effect on future news stories; and
5. The impact of the inquiry on the rights of others.
The party attempting to invalidate the immunity would have the
burden of satisfying the first three requirements; the newsman would
then have to satisfy the fourth requirement. The court would con-
duct an independent investigation of the fifth element. Procedurally,
the newsman should always raise his immunity at the beginning of a
trial or hearing, otherwise the immunity will be considered
waived. 23
1. Alternative Sources
As a threshold requirement, the party seeking the reporter's in-
formation should be required to show that no alternative sources of
information are available to him at a reasonable time prior to
trial. 22 "4 For example, when a defendant is seeking information all
other persons who had access to such information should be ques-
tioned before requesting it from the newsman. In a case such as
220. 85 Cal App. 3d 241, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1978).
221. 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979).
222. Rosato, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 238-40, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 464-65 (1975) (Franson,
J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
223. CAL. EVID. CODE § 911 (West 1966 & Supp. 1984) provides, generally, that a per-
son has no privilege not to testify or to produce evidence, except as provided by statute. Thus,
the newsman should raise statutory and now constitutional provisions to justify his immunity
from contempt orders, and to prevent a court from construing his failure to raise the immunity
as a waiver of his rights. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 912 (West 1966 & Supp. 1984).
224. See United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 145 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1126 (1981); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699-700 (1974); United States v. lozia,
13 F.R.D. 335, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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Kaye, 25 the judge should sustain the reporter's objections pertaining
to information regarding an interview between the reporter and the
defendant, because the defendant is an alternate source. This re-
quirement should be strictly enforced to engender the proper respect
for the newsman and his pledge of confidentiality to sources.
2. Relevance
The information sought from the newsman must be relevant to
the issues in the case. Too often reporters are the victims of "fishing
expeditions," the purpose of which is either general discovery or to
create appealable "strawman issues." The courts must not tolerate
generalized claims that the information sought is necessary for a
"fair trial." Rather, the information should bear on an actual claim
or defense that may reasonably be raised at trial. If the court deems
that inquiry into certain matters is proper, the questions should be
strictly limited to those matters.
3. Necessity
In addition to relevance, the party seeking the reporter's infor-
mation should also have to demonstrate a genuine need: the re-
quested material must be essential to the disposition of the case. In
Brown v. Commonwealth,"' a murder trial, the Virginia Supreme
Court held that information essential to a fair trial must be "mate-
rial to proof of any element of a criminal offense, or to proof of the
defense asserted by the defendant, or to a reduction in the classifica-
tion or gradation of the offense charged, or to a mitigation of the
penalty attached.112 7 In a criminal proceeding, this requirement pro-
vides a more definitive and affirmative standard than that announced
in the CBS case, which merely required a reasonable possibility of
exoneration. 228 In Kaye's hearing, 9 ' the prosecutor had no need to
call Kaye because the undercover investigator could provide the nec-
essary information to bring and prove the charges against the Hilles-
tads. Another issue in Kaye was that the defense was denied effective
cross-examination. The Brown court resolved this issue by requiring
that proof of inconsistent statements be material to a fair trial. 8 '
225. See supra text accompanying notes 147-54.
226. 204 S.E.2d 429 (Va. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974).
227. Id. at 431.
228. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 147-54.
230. Brown, 204 S.E.2d at 431.
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4. Chilling Effect
If the defendant satisfies the court that the requirements of no
alternate sources, relevance and need are met, the burden should
then shift to the newsman to demonstrate that the information falls
within the immunity. The newsman should have to show that he in
fact made a pledge of confidentiality to his source because this played
a large role in the Hammarley court's decision to compel disclosure.
Also, CBS requires that the source remain confidential in order to
justify the newsman's protection. After the newsman shows that the
information falls within the immunity, the court should consider the
potential chilling effect upon future news gathering and dissemina-
tion. Specifically, a court should consider if its action might dry up
news sources, interfere with the editorial process, or deter the re-
porter's future investigations.
5. Impact on Others
Finally, the court should evaluate the impact that the inquiry
may have on others. In Rosato, Justice Franson felt the majority
should have considered the public's right to know the substance of
the grand jury transcript, because it dealt with the improprieties of
certain public officials.""' This concern is particularly relevant if re-
vealing a confidential source's identity could result in retaliatory ac-
tion against the source or undermine his role as a vital informant.
All five of these elements should be weighed by a court before
compelling disclosure from the newsman. This will ensure the maxi-
mum protection for the press, while still allowing a safety valve for
those instances in which justice demands disclosure. Should the court
determine that disclosure is necessary, an in camera proceeding
should be utilized to mitigate the effects of revealing either sensitive
information or confidential sources.
V. CONCLUSION
As watchdogs of our nation, newsmen provide an invaluable
public service. It is well recognized that freedom of the press is one
of the central foundations of our democratic government. It has
equally been recognized that contempt citations and imprisonment
threaten the newsman's ability to gather vital, sensitive information.
Both the people and the legislature have responded to this perceived
threat. The judiciary, previously responding to the newsman's asser-
231. Rosato, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 239-40, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
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tions of immunity in a tepid manner, should now accord newsmen
the utmost protection, unless a significant competing interest necessi-
tates a different result. With these guidelines in mind, the courts can
effectively balance the rights of the newsman and the criminal de-
fendant, and arrive at a just conclusion consistent with the ideals of
California's new shield law.
Richard A. Sipos
